The hard approach of the police to recent service delivery protests has been interpreted by some as comparable to the methods of riot police during the 1980s and early 1990s.
But closer inspection suggests that this is unwarranted. A multitude of factors have caused pressure within the South African Police Service (SAPS) that could have led to police adopting a harder stance.
First, only specialist public order police (Pop) members have the requisite level of training and expertise to deal with marches and protests. Ordinary members of police stations and the metro police generally do not have this training and should be acting only as back-up to the Pop.
Indications are that in some of the recent protest marches, metro police and station members with only crowd-management training have been guilty of taking command of situations and ultimately of using force too hastily.
Second, formal crowd-management training designed for station members and metro police officers who initially respond to incidents has been inconsistent and incomplete. Despite the shortfalls in training, these “first responders” are still required to police violent protests. Indications are that in recent protest actions station members have been acting in the absence of Pop members and neglecting standard crowd-management procedure.
Third, in-service training, a routine, continual training requirement for members trained in crowd management, has not been undertaken systematically by station members. This raises doubt about their ability to deal with situations they now face.
These three deficiencies can be attributed largely to the police organisational restructuring process in 2006 in which a number of Pop units were closed down and half of the human resource capacity was decentralised to station level.
The result of all these factors has been a rapid recourse to aggressive police action often preceded by minimal and sometimes scant negotiations with the protesters. This is ultimately in violation of crowd-management procedure.
This said, public order policing has progressed remarkably in the past 15 years. A softer approach has been adopted, by way of training by the Belgian police in 1996 and the enactment of the Regulations of Gatherings Act of 1993. This combination was intended to ensure that marches and events remain consistent with the Bill of Rights.
The Act clearly prescribes procedures police have to follow when taking action against disorderly protesters. These procedures are designed to limit the use of force — while bearing in mind the particulars of each situation. Factors taken into account include threat levels and aggravating factors such as the presence of weapons and criminal elements.
The Act also requires the police to take the following steps:
- Maintain ongoing negotiations with the protesters;
- Continue with threat-level assessments;
- Ask the crowd to disperse;
- Order the crowd to disperse within a specified time in a loud voice and in two languages;
- If within the specified time the crowd has not dispersed, a Pop member may order his members to disperse the participants and may for that purpose order the use of force; and
- The degree of force must not be greater than is necessary and must be in proportion to the circumstances of the case.
In crowd-management situations “force” denotes the use of minimum force, which includes the use of shields, rubber batons, stun grenades and water cannons. As a last resort, shotguns with rubber bullets may be used. Maximum force — the use of live ammunition — may be used only when there is a threat to life, including that of the police.
The use of shotguns and rubber bullets has been a topic of much controversy in the past. Despite rubber bullets being reduced in size, the ricochet action caused severe injury. The SAPS’s standing orders used to require that police fire rubber bullets at a 45angle into the ground in front of the protesters. Although this was intended to minimise the damage caused by the bullets, they have caused severe injury to protesters.
A less damaging alternative has now been provided by the SAPS. When rubber rounds are used, these must be fired directly at the legs of protesters, but at a distance of 25m to 40m for reduced-size rounds, and a distance of 40m to 80m for normal rubber rounds. This alternative may be used only by members trained in the use of rubber rounds.
Although police action in the past few weeks is of concern, it cannot and should not be measured against the heavy-handedness of the riot police during apartheid. But training, staffing and resource levels must be addressed to minimise the demand on the services of Pop members.
If this situation is not rapidly rectified the ability of the police to deal with unruly behaviour (including that linked to the 2010 Fifa World Cup) will be placed in serious doubt.
Bilkis Omar is a researcher in the crime, justice and politics programme at the Institute for Security Studies